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Culture and the End of History1 
Robert J. Antonio 
University of Kansas 
Although a very important figure in interdisciplinary social the­
ory, Nietzsche is absent from sociological theory, especially in the 
United States. Equating rationalization with cultural homogeniza-
tion and liquidation of particularity, Nietzsche saw "decadence" 
where modern social theorists saw progress. He held that sociology 
drapes cultural domination, regimentation, and exhaustion with the 
appearance of legitimacy. This essay explores his views about the 
depletion of social resources stressed in modern theory. It elaborates 
his "antisociology" and then traces the impact of this framework 
on three divergent currents of social theory. Nietzsche is read 
against the backdrop of modern theory in order to explore his con­
tinuing challenge to this tradition and his relevance to sociology. 
Fundamental innovations:. . .  I n  p l a c e  o f  " s o c i o l o g y , "  a  t h e o r y  
of the forms of domination. In place of "society," the cultural 
complex, as my chief interest. (Nietzsche, The Will to Power) 
INTRODUCTION 
Nietzsche as Postmodern Precursor 
Culture has been a resurgent interest among sociologists for nearly a 
decade (e.g., Featherstone 1986; Robertson 1988; Alexander and Seidman 
1990; Munch and Smelser 1993; Griswold 1994). This trend follows 
events outside the discipline that have made culture a hotly contested 
terrain: "culture wars" over diversity, the canon, political correctness, 
1 Many thanks to Alessandro Bonanno, Steve Best, Goran Dahl, Pat Johnston, Ste­
phen Kalberg, Doug Kellner, Annette Kuhlmann, Ernest Manheim, Lawrence Scaff, 
David Smith, and Isidore Wallimann for their help on different drafts of this essay 
or with ideas central to my argument. Three AJS reviewers also provided good cri­
tiques of the essay; it would have been stronger if I were able to engage all of their 
critical points. I especially want to thank Martin Riesebrodt for an extremely inci­
sive critique that contributed substantially to the final version. Finally, I am in debt 
to Pasquale Caracciolo and Gary Shapiro for stirring my interest in Nietzsche; how­
ever, these friends are not to blame for my positions or errors. Direct correspondence 
to Robert J. Antonio, Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, 716 Fraser 
Hall, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-2172. 
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and cultural studies programs. Related battles rage over interdisciplinary 
social theories. Claiming to put social thought on fresh ground, new 
cultural theorists attack modern social theory, especially classical vari­
ants, for "essentialism," "foundationalism," "totalization," and oblit­
eration of "difference" (i.e., of local, minority, and non-Western 
voices).2 Nietzsche, however, is largely unscathed by their broadsides. 
Rather, the new cultural theorists see him as their major precursor. 
Nietzsche was practically unknown before madness permanently ended 
his writing in 1889, but soon after that date he gained enormous interna­
tional repute (e.g., Kaufmann 1974, pp. 418-20; Hughes [1958] 1977, pp. 
336-91; Thatcher 1970; Nehamas 1985; Rosenthal 1986; Thomas 1986; E. 
Heller 1988; Aschheim 1992).3 Diverse thinkers believed that he posed a 
fundamental, subversive challenge to modern sociopolitical life by 
exposing how conservatism, reformism, and radicalism alike serve domi­
nation and mediocrity and by providing a missing optic illuminating hid­
den links between rationalization and mass regimentation. Sensing an un­
bridgeable gap between the promises and realities of mass democracy, they 
wanted something entirely new. In a passage suggestive of today's post­
modern tendencies, Georg Simmel ([1900] 1978, p. 484) spoke of a "secret 
restlessness" or "helpless urgency" that pushes thinkers "from socialism 
to Nietzsche." In the wake of World War I and pervasive disenchantment 
with modern institutions and creeds, Thomas Mann stated aptly ([1918] 
1983, p. 366) "I beg pardon for seeing Nietzsche everywhere, and only 
him." 
J Poststructuralism and postmodernism (e.g., Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, 
Gayatri Spivak, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Jean Baudrillard, Jean-Fangois 
Lyotard, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) are probably the most important new 
cultural theories, while, among many fusions, postmodern feminism has had wide 
impact (e.g., Nicholson 1990). In North America, these approaches have posed stiff 
challenges in the humanities (Berman 1988) and, more recently, in social anthropology 
(e.g., Clifford 1988; Keesing 1989; Shore 1988) and sociology (e.g., Denzin 1986; 
Seidman 1991; Seidman and Wagner 1991; Pfohl 1993). Modem social theory arose 
from Enlightenment thought and later positions that tempered its rational features. 
Classical theorists (e.g., Weber and Durkheim) addressed the overall path of modem 
social development empirically and normatively. Their work was more historical, 
systematic, and complex than their precursors (e.g., Adam Smith and Auguste Comte). 
Contemporary modem theorists (e.g., Daniel Bell and Jiirgen Habermas) follow the 
tracks of classical theory but employ added resources from specialized science. Argua­
bly, the classical phase began with Marx's analyses of the early, second industrial 
revolution (1840s-1860s), but most work was done after 1890 and before the rise of 
specialized social science in the 1920s and 1930s. Marx and Nietzsche are both transi­
tional figures (Antonio and Kellner 1992). 
5 Bracketed dates, of course, refer either to the time of first publication or the year 
the work was written. For Nietzsche, separate dates are not provided for material 
added to the second edition (1887) of The Gay Science. Moreover, The Will to Power 
is composed of selections from Nietzsche's notebooks, arranged and published by 
Nietzsche's sister after his death. 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer (1977, p. 116) saw Nietzsche as "the great, fateful 
figure who fundamentally altered the task of the critique of the subjective 
spirit of our century"; Karl Mannheim ([1936] 1955, pp. 309-11) argued 
that Nietzsche, along with Marx, began the "sociology of knowledge"; and 
Paul Ricoeur (1970, pp. 32-36) held that he initiated, with Marx and 
Freud, the hermeneutics of "suspicion." Treating conscious thought and 
morality as "surface" phenomena, Nietzsche made the representation of 
reality deeply problematic and shook modern theory's rational founda­
tions.4 His views about the entwinement of knowledge and power and the 
split between subjective experience and objective culture implied a radical 
crisis of representation and a need to "overcome" modern thought (e.g., 
Simmel [1907] 1991; Scaff 1989). Martin Heidegger ([1961] 19916, pp. 6-8) 
held that Nietzsche pointed to a "consummation" of the "modern age" 
and a possible end of "Western history." Max Weber is purported to have 
said: "The honesty of a contemporary scholar . .. can be measured by the 
position he takes vis-k-vis Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever fails to acknowl­
edge that he could not carry out the most important part of his own work 
without the work done by both, Marx and Nietzsche, deceives himself and 
others. The intellectual world in which we live is a world which to a large 
extent bears the imprint of Marx and Nietzsche."5 
However, in contrast to Marx, who has finally been included among 
the founders of "sociological theory,"6 Nietzsche is glaringly absent from 
sociological discourse. In the United States, he is left out entirely, and 
elsewhere he is seldom discussed.' While many nonsociologists (e.g., Sig-
4 Nietzsche anticipated core aspects of psychoanalytic theory; see Jones (1963, pp. 
206-7, 276, 365), Sulloway (1979, pp. 467-68), Jung (1961, pp. 101-3, 153, 189, 207; 
[1921] 1976, pp. 136-46; [1934-39] 1988), and Hughes (1977, pp. 105-60). 
5 Reportedly, Weber said this to his students, shortly before his death, following a 
debate involving Oswald Spengler. The quote follows Wolfgang Schluchter's (1989, 
p. 316) translation of Eduard Baumgarten. 
61 agree with Steven Seidman's (1991) distinction between "social theory" and "so­
ciological theory"; the modern theory tradition described above is social theory even 
though important segments have been reframed and incorporated into sociology. 
7 In U.S. scholarship, Nietzsche does not appear in specialized theoretical work or theory 
texts. Forexample, Sorokin (1928; [1937] 1962) mentioned Nietzsche once in his compre­
hensive survey of sociological theory and only casually in his massive Social and Cultural 
Dynamics (even though Nietzsche has direct relevance for its central theme). His name 
appears only seven times, with no discussion, in more than a thousand pages of Becker 
and Barnes's ([1938] 1961) major history of social thought, which, in addition to sociolo­
gists, provides detailed coverage of diverse and often obscure philosophical, religious, 
and political thinkers. Similarly, he is mentioned only six times in roughly 2,000 pages 
of specialized essays edited by Barnes, Becker, and Becker (1940) and by Barnes (1948). 
These important works deal extensively with German social philosophy and social the­
ory (e.g., Wundt, Dilthey, Rickert, Tonnies, Weber, Simmel, Stein, Troeltsch, Freud, 
Adler, Oppenheimer, and Freyer). In one essay, Becker (1940), making copious refer­
ences to German texts and quoting Goethe in German at the head of each subsection, 
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mund Freud, Alfred Marshall, Lewis Henry Morgan, and Wilhelm 
Wundt) and relatively minor thinkers (e.g., Ludwig Gumplowicz, 
Jacques Novicow, Othmar Spann, CSlestin Bougie, and Walter Bagehot) 
have often received close sociological attention, Nietzsche is usually ig­
nored even in detailed analyses of the social theorists (e.g., Weber, Sim-
mel, Scheler) he influenced. This is still the case today, in spite of the 
major resurgence of interdisciplinary interest in his social theory. 
addressed thinkers such as Max Weber and Alfred Weber, Biicher, Schmoller, Lowith, 
Spengler, Barth, and Gogarten. Even pieces written by German scholars about theorists 
who borrowed broadly from Nietzsche (e.g., Scheler, Spengler) say little or nothing 
about his influence. Thus, the inattention to his work was hardly a product of ignorance 
of German language and thought. In another major volume, Salomon (1945), elaborat­
ing the history of German sociology, discussed sociological thinkers (e.g., Weber, Sim-
mel, Scheler) and nonsociologists influenced by Nietzsche without mentioning him. In 
an essay on the sociology of religion, another German speaker discussed many nonsociol­
ogists with only one passing reference to Nietzsche (Wach 1945). Merton's (1945) treat­
ment of the sociology of knowledge covered Scheler and other German thinkers with no 
mention of Nietzsche. Parsons's ([1937] 1968) and Bendix's (1960) pathbreaking studies, 
which introduced Weber to English-speaking audiences, mentioned Nietzsche only in 
passing. The massive Theories of Society (Parsons et al. 1961) had selections from philos­
ophers, psychologists, historians, economists, theologians, and many other nonsociolo­
gists, but included nothing from Nietzsche. A brief essay on him appeared in the Ency­
clopedia of Social Science (Andler 1933), but he is absent from later works of a similar 
nature (see Sills 1968; Borgatta and Borgatta 1992). Early sociologists occasionally made 
passing objections to his positions on democracy (e.g., Cooley [1902] 1964, pp. 28-29), 
Christianity (e.g., Ross 1901, p. 425), and progress (e.g., Ward 1903, p. 231). Later, he 
was sometimes mentioned briefly in discussions of Ruth Benedict's ([1934] 1960) use of 
his concepts of "Appollonian" and "Dionysian" culture (earlier, Jung had employed 
them; see Jung 1976). Other passing references identify Nietzsche with racism, national­
ism, militarism, fascism, and Nazism (e.g., Bernard 1939, p. 24; 1942, p. 539). Bogar-
dus's (1948, pp. 366-67) superficial comments linked him to the Nazi regime; Martindale 
(1960; 1981) also provided simplistic coverage; and Timasheff ([1955] 1967) ignored him 
completely as do most recent texts (e.g., Ashley and Orenstein 1985; Ritzer 1992; Turner 
1991). Exceptions are Collins and Makowsky's ([1972] 1993, pp. 66-80) mostly bio­
graphical account and brief selections in Farganis's (1993, pp. 97-104) collection. More 
telling, however, is that Nietzsche is mentioned only in passing in Aron's ([1965] 1989) 
classic text (based on his lectures at the Sorbonne) and not at all in Munch and Smelser's 
Theory of Culture (1993). Lemert (1993) mentions his "marginalized" status, but still 
leaves him out of a collection aimed explicitly at breaking with the canonical narrative 
of sociological theory. Although I make no pretense of having scrutinized the entire his­
tory of American sociological theory, it is safe to say that Nietzsche has been left out of 
the story. Of course, there are exceptions, especially in Europe. For example, Lawrence 
E. Hazelrigg (1989), Michael Maffesoli (1991, 1993), Mike Gane (1992), Georg Stauth, 
and Bryan Turner (e.g., Stauth and Turner 1988,1992; Turner 1982) address Nietzsche. 
Other sociologists, such as Anthony Giddens, David Frisby, and Wilhelm Hennis, also 
consider him as a context for their work. But such individuals usually work in the style of 
social theory. Even in Europe, Nietzsche tends to be ignored in sociological discussions, 
including discourses about thinkers he influenced (see Baier 1981-82). An important 
exception, published while this essay was under review, is the Canadian sociologist Ir­
ving M. Zeitlin's Nietzsche: A Re-Examination (1994). 
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Exploring Nietzsche's Antisociological Challenge 
Even the ideals of science can be deeply, yet completely uncon­
sciously influenced by decadence: our entire sociology is proof 
of that. ... It knows only the form of decay of society, and 
inevitably it takes its own instincts of decay for the norms of 
sociological judgment. (Nietzsche, The Will to Power) 
In a classic study of late 19th- and early 20th-century social theory, 
H. Stuart Hughes (1977, pp. 34, 104-5) found numerous theorists "elab­
orating more rigorously and systematically" positions that "Nietzsche 
had thrown out in fragmentary form." But he stressed that Nietzsche's 
specific impact on thinkers is hard to disentangle from that of the larger 
cultural climate he helped forge. His fragmented, contradictory, and 
"open" texts welcome diverse interpretations, selective appropriations, 
and disjunctive fusions. Consequently, his impact has been as ambiguous 
as it has been pervasive and manifold. For example, he has been both 
widely appropriated and attacked by feminist theorists.8 Even his self-
proclaimed followers (whom he forswore) have been diverse and contra­
dictory. Nietzsche's ideas have "commingled" with many divergent ap­
proaches and have operated as "an inspirational subtext" or "pervasive 
atmospheric presence" (Aschheim 1992, pp. 2, 59). As Foucault (1989, 
p. 247) held, "There is not just one Nietzscheanism. One cannot say 
there is a true Nietzscheanism and that this one is truer than the other." 
Still, Nietzsche casts a distinctive shadow in social theory. Seeing him 
as the primary godparent of the sociology of culture, Horst Baier stressed 
8 Nietzsche's views about women are highly ambiguous and deeply problematic; inter­
pretations of his positions on gender and his use of masculinist metaphors vary widely 
and are the subject of intense disagreements that are difficult to summarize. For 
different perspectives, see Derrida (1979), Thomas (1986, pp. 132-41), Schutte (1986, 
pp. 176-85), Gilman (1987), Graybeal (1990), Ackerman (1990, pp. 122-37), Irigaray 
(1991), Gane (1992), Patton (1993), Kofman (1993), Burgard (1994). Contradictory 
readings also abound in other areas. For example, during World War I, John Dewey 
and George Bernard Shaw connected him to antinationalist and antiauthoritarian 
views, while Durkheim and many British thinkers tied him to German militarism 
(Durkheim [1916] 1986, p. 232; Dewey [1916] 1985, pp. 220-21; Thomas 1986, pp. 
125-31; Thatcher 1970, pp. 175-268). Different critics see diverse pathologies emanat­
ing from Nietzsche's work, but all agree that it has had enormous impact. Karl Lowith 
(1966, p. 16) asserted that his "ideas paved the way to the Third Reich"; Georg 
Lukacs ([1962] 1980, pp. 309-99) saw him as the master theorist of irrationalism and 
the imperialist phase of capitalism; Habermas (1987a) held that he began a postmodern 
regress from democratic drought; Carl Schmitt ([1925] 1986, p. 20) considered him a 
"high priest," who stirred dangerous currents of "political romanticism"; and Leo 
Strauss (1989, pp. 24-26, 31) described him as "the philosopher of relativism" and 
linked him to fascism. On Nietzsche and politics, see Kaufmann (1974), Hughes (1977, 
pp. 336-431), Love (1986), Schutte (1986), Thomas (1986), Strong (1988), Warren 
(1988), Durr (1988), Lapenies (1988), P. Heller (1988), Putz (1988), Taylor (1990), 
Aschheim (1992). 
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his formative impact on some of the greatest German-speaking theorists 
(i.e., Weber, Simmel, Scheler, Tonnies, Freyer, Mannheim). Echoing 
Weber, Baier held that Marx and Nietzsche raise the most fundamental 
questions for social theory. Yet, while Marx's contribution has been ac­
knowledged, Nietzsche is still ignored in recent sociology. Baier recog­
nized the difficulties inhering in efforts to elaborate Nietzsche's indirect 
impact on social theory. But he suggested that asking how Nietzsche 
posed "the question of society" and following "traces" of his ideas in 
works of important theorists would help clarify his contribution. Both 
strategies will be employed in this article (Baier 1981-82, pp. 25, 27, 
32-33). In addition, however, the "sociological" vision Nietzsche op­
posed will be entertained to draw out his challenge to modern social 
theory. 
Regardless of many differences, classical theorists converged around 
some, central sociological presuppositions, questions, and themes. They 
embraced "progressive" features of sociocultural differentiation or, at 
least, viewed certain, consequent, social conditions or capacities as civi­
lizing forces. Most implied that the process shatters the rigid, parochial 
constraints of tradition, shaping individuality in a freer, richer, social 
way. Divergent values, norms, and ideas give rise to muitifaceted, reflex­
ive, and autonomous social selves who are capable of communicating 
effectively with ever more diverse types of people across highly special­
ized roles. They forge highly complex cooperative networks that generate 
new social powers and consequent geometric advances in productivity. 
Classical theorists saw their normative critiques to be anchored in nascent 
forms of legitimate authority inhering in the new types of social interde­
pendence and solidarity. While also warning of looming threats and pa­
thologies, even pessimists detected vital, new social resources (e.g., social 
science) to moderate crises, reduce coercion, and strengthen the new 
modes of legitimate authority. Overall, they believed that rationalization 
unleashes social forces of universal significance, which, if properly di­
rected, would liberate and nurture human particularity.9 By contrast, 
Nietzsche equated rationalization with cultural homogenization and liq­
uidation of particularity. He saw "decadence" where classical theorists 
saw progress. In his view, sociology drapes sweeping cultural domina­
tion, regimentation, and exhaustion with the appearance of legitimacy. 
This essay will explore Nietzsche's views about the absence of the 
social resources claimed by modern theorists and his inversion of their 
most basic perspectives about modernity. It will elaborate his "antisociol-
ogy," and then trace its impact on three divergent currents of social 
9 This is an extremely simplified summary of a very complex discursive field. For 
more detailed discussion, see Antonio and Kellner (1992), Kloppenberg (1986). 
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theory. Contrasting themes from modern theory will be addressed at key 
junctures of both sections. While my intent is to address some possibly 
revealing threads of Nietzsche's social theory and to clarify his relevance 
for sociology, the reader must be cautioned about the many unresolved 
riddles, ambiguities, and contradictions in his texts. Any consistent read­
ing risks harmonizing tensions he wanted to remain problematic. In this 
essay, however, he is read against the backdrop of modern theory In 
order to explore his continuing challenge to this tradition. 
NIETZSCHE'S ANTISOCIOLOGY 
The Socratic Culture Complex: The End of Particularity 
One should inaugurate culture in the right place—not in the 
"soul" . . . [but in] the body, demeanor, diet, physiology: the 
rest follows. . . . Christianity, which despised the body, has 
up to now been mankind's greatest misfortune. (Nietzsche, 
Twilight of the Idols) 
Nietzsche rejected the enduring Western conception of the "rational sub­
ject," which portrays reason or mind as a "higher" faculty governing 
the body. He was especially critical of the new version of the subject 
or the social self, emergent during his own day. Holding that "every 
association" makes strong individuals "shudder slightly" and that "all 
contact ... 'in society'—involves inevitable uncleanliness," Nietzsche 
identified individuality with bodily "intelligence" and "multiplicity." 
Consequently, he viewed the genuine "self" to be a nonsocial, irreduc­
ible, individual particularity and contradictory to the "herd"-like "ego" 
(i.e., the social self). Nietzsche believed culture to originate from and to 
regulate the body. Superior cultures nurture particularity by providing 
resources to express bodily drives in a "spiritualized" way that favors 
pleasure and "ascending life." Although these cultures provide healthy 
individuals resources to express themselves vitally and creatively, they 
also exert "domestication" that constrains the destructive inclinations of 
the "weak." Some cultures, however, domesticate so thoroughly and 
repress bodily drives so severely that the "herd instinct of obedience" 
and consequent guilt, illness, and "nihilism" prevail (Nietzsche [1882] 
1974, p. 342; [1883-85] 1969c, pp. 61-66, 86, 118, 120; [1883-88] 19686, 
pp. 203-4, 347-49, 363; [1886] 1966, pp. 26, 110-11, 226; [1888] 1968a, 
pp. 29-44). 
The overarching "moral" regulation of inferior cultures is animated 
by ressentiment (i.e., the inclination of the weak to make their suffering 
meaningful by blaming others and taking "imaginary revenge"). Ac­
cording to Nietzsche, "ascetic priests" attain cultural leadership by ma­
nipulating this sentiment, creating normative systems or "slave morali­
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ties" that promise salvation for the obedient and punishment for the 
dissolute. By intensifying and redirecting ressentiment inward against 
the blameworthy body and outward against collective enemies, morality 
forges powerlessness into mass discipline and the weak into a society 
(Nietzsche [1887] 19696, pp. 36-37, 116-18, 125-27; 19686, p. 156). 
Moreover, healthy, uninhibited individuals are made prime targets of 
ressentiment and coercion. Bound by slave morality, the herd collects 
and defeats the "strong." Thus, Nietzsche reverses Spencerian "survival 
of the fittest" because in his view social "selection" favors the weak 
(Nietzsche 19686, pp. 55, 75, 343, 361-65, 479; 1968a, pp. 75-76). 
According to Nietzsche, Western culture breeds especially powerful, 
unhealthy ressentiment. He argued that Socrates, an ingenious ascetic 
priest, initiated the "modern" or "Socratic" culture complex, giving 
"reason" absolute dominion over the body and, thereby, taming the 
explosion of impulses and desires unleashed by the collapse of Greek 
antiquity. Socrates' equation of truth and virtue with disembodied reason 
gave rise to the West's characteristic splits between mind and body, 
subject and object, and theory and practice. Socratic culture's brutal 
domestication turns drives "backward" against the body, creating crip­
pling "inwardness" and "self-laceration" (Nietzsche [1872] 1967; 19686, 
pp. 156, 202-3, 328; 19696, pp. 84-85; 1968a, pp. 29-34). 
Nietzsche saw Christianity as the prototypical slave morality. Its dem­
ocratic ethos, which provided the ultimate roots of bourgeois and social­
ist ideals, greatly magnified original Socratic ressentiment. The promise 
of equality and salvation to all the "subjugated and oppressed" and of 
eternal damnation to all nonbelievers demanded unparalleled denial of 
the body, absolute obedience, "mortal hostility to reality," and "hatred 
of those who think differently" and of "multiplicity." Protestantism 
made matters worse. Regardless of contributions to "mobility," "lib­
erty," and "science," the Reformation made everyone his or her own 
priest, generating methodical self-regulation in the herd and brutal vio­
lence against the strong. According to Nietzsche, the Protestant "north" 
is the heartland of Socratic culture (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 293, 310-13; 
1968a, pp. 131-39, 184-86). 
Nietzsche held that Christianity subordinated family, locality, eth­
nicity, and nation to the most universal cultural domination the world 
had ever known. In his view, however, the Enlightenment and bourgeois 
revolutions made the process even more extensive and inclusive. While 
promising earthly salvation, the new "democratic" creeds (e.g., positiv­
ism, utilitarianism, feminism, Spencerianism, socialism, ad infinitum) 
secularize and pluralize slave morality and institute much more system­
atic, diffuse social control. Explosive sociocultural differentiation, cele­
brated by modern theorists, multiplies, disperses, and specializes the sites 
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for ressentiment, asceticism, and discipline. Rather than genuine diver­
sity, it produces nearly identical "useful, industrious, handy, multipur­
pose herd animal[s]." Nietzsche's charge that "the whole of sociology" 
draws its norms from "decaying forms of society" means that it reflects 
and serves Socratic rationalization. His vision of global liquidation of 
individuality and cultural particularity contradicts modern theory's 
grand narrative of rationality, freedom, and progress. Attributing the 
conditions to enduring aspects of Western civilization, he envisioned a 
much deeper crisis than modern theorists ever imagined (Nietzsche 1966, 
pp. 176-77; 1968a, p. 91; 19686, pp. 478). 
The End of the Social/Cultural Exhaustion 
All of us are no longer material for a society. (Nietzsche, The 
Gay Science) 
Nietzsche held that the current wave of rationalization has depleted cul­
ture so severely that virtually all of "our institutions are no longer fit for 
anything" (Nietzsche 1968a, p. 93). Because "shared" values, norms, 
and ideas are no longer binding, culturally reproduced social integration 
has dissolved. Rather than being normatively regulated, uncoerced be­
havior follows the grooves of habit, organizational routine, and mass 
culture or is simply disoriented (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4, 338; 19696, 
pp. 121-26; 1969c, p. 226; 19686, p. ISO). 
For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, impera­
tive which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to 
authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding 
generations backwards and forwards in infinitum. . . . The entire West 
has lost those instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which the 
future grows. . . . One lives for today, one lives very fast—one lives very 
irresponsibly: it is precisely this which one calls "freedom." That which 
makes institutions institutions is despised, hated, rejected: whenever the 
word "authority" is so much as heard one believes oneself in danger of a 
new slavery. (Nietzsche 1968a, pp. 93-94) 
The state's newly developed top-to-bottom officialdom is emblematic 
of this sweeping disintegration; its arsenal of disciplinary mechanisms fill 
the breach left by the lack of legitimate authority. Nietzsche held that 
the state and culture are inherent "antagonists." Pointing to the cultural 
stagnation that followed Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian War, 
he stated, "Coming to power is a costly business: power makes stu­
pid. . . . The Germans—once they were called a nation of thinkers: Do 
they still think at all? Nowadays the Germans are bored with intel­
lect, . . . politics devours all seriousness for really intellectual things— 
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Deutschland, Deutschland iiber alles was, I fear, the end of German 
philosophy" (Nietzsche 1968a, p. 60). Immobilizing intellectual and aes­
thetic creativity, the power state manipulates through a new mix of dra-
conian law, welfare provision, propaganda, and nationalism. It is a "new 
idol" and the focal point of dangerous currents of mass ressentiment and 
regimentation (Nietzsche [1873-76] 1983, pp. 3-6; 1969c, 75-78; [1883] 
19686, p. 48; [1888] 19826; [1888] 1967; 1968a, 62-63; [1888], 1969a, p. 
319). 
Nietzsche viewed socialism as an outgrowth of Socratic culture's demo­
cratic ethos and expansionary state.10 The self-righteous egalitarian, col-
lectivist, and redemptive thrust of socialism's highly secularized Chris­
tian ressentiment makes it all the more dangerous. Because socialists 
simply want to manage "more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, 
more uniformly," Nietzsche argued, they would, if they came to power, 
amplify all the pathologies inherent in "state power." He held that so­
cialism is a "younger brother" of ancient despotism, promising "iron 
chains," "fearful discipline," "abolition of the individualand "com­
plete subservience." It would re-create "Chinese conditions" of enduring 
stasis and absolutism (Nietzsche [1878-80] 1986, pp. 173-74; [1881] 
1982a, pp. 83, 109, 126-27; 1974, pp. 99, 338; 19686, pp. 77-78, 
463-64). 
In contrast to modern theorists, even Marx, Nietzsche did not see 
anything redeeming about capitalism. Thus, his antistate and antiso-
cialist views had nothing to do with classical liberalism. He loathed capi­
talism's overarching impersonalism and instrumentalism, holding that 
they turned everyone into "industrious ants" (Nietzsche 1982a, pp. 126— 
27). In one work, he followed his critique of the state with a blistering 
attack on "the flies of the marketplace," stressing their falseness, petty 
ambitiousness, baseness, capriciousness, and sycophancy. Capitalism 
produces all-encompassing haste, superficiality, and life-denying special­
ized labor. Worse off than slaves, wage workers are at the "mercy of 
brute need" and employers who ruthlessly "exploit" them. Nietzsche 
considered capitalism's so-called culture to be completely vulgarized and 
debased (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 164-65; 1986, p. 167; 1974, pp. 107-8; 
19696, pp. 78-81, 227, 258-59, 296-97). Suggesting a Marcusean "great 
refusal," he urged that "workers of Europe ought henceforth to declare 
themselves as a class a human impossibility and not, as usually happens, 
only a somewhat harsh and inappropriate social arrangement; they ought 
to inaugurate within the European beehive an age of a great swarming-
10 Nietzsche did not explore specific socialist programs, Marx, or Marxism (Kaufmann 
1974, p. 292n.7). Also, his ideas overlap with Marx's positions at some key points; 
see Love (1986). 
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out such as has never been seen before, and through this act of free 
emigration in the grand manner to protest against the machine, against 
capital, and against the choice now threatening them of being compelled 
to become either the slave of the state or of the party of disruption" 
(Nietzsche 1982a, pp. 125-27). 
Against social Darwinist claims that capitalist competition produces 
"the fittest" individuals, Nietzsche held that it gives rise to "smaller . . . 
more governable" types. Capitalism's formal equality, relativistic inter­
dependence, and instrumentalism level status and value hierarchies, re­
duce tastes to the lowest common denominator, and destroy cultural 
constraints on ressentiment. This complete evaporation of legitimate au­
thority provides nearly unlimited opportunities for the ascent of frauds 
and mediocre herd leaderships. Thus, Nietzsche cleaved modern theory's 
connections between capitalism, autonomous individuality, and progress. 
Liberalism and socialism both manifest fundamental pathologies of the 
same exhausted cultural complex (Nietzsche 1974, p. 202; 19686, pp. 55, 
75, 79). 
Nietzsche ridiculed the positivist dream of substituting science for reli­
gion, seeing it as a gross deception illustrative of the depth of cultural 
exhaustion. He detested positions that treated science as an independent 
worldview and ignored its need for presuppositions (a "philosophy" or 
"faith" to give it "a direction, meaning, a limit, a method, a right to 
exist"). In a biting passage about an expert researcher on the "leech's 
brain," he satirized the tunnel vision of narrowly specialized science. Its 
'faith in truth," stoical discipline, and narrow purview betray its hidden 
roots in priestly asceticism. Although admiring the inexorable honesty of 
properly practiced specialized science, Nietzsche held that it has no inher­
ent meaning—its value depends entirely on its consequences for life. 
Science becomes trivial or dangerous when its problems, programs, and 
knowledge are considered to be value free or to be a source of values. 
The idea of science imperiously directing social life justifies Socratic disci­
pline and control. Such pseudoscience is no tonic for cultural crisis. 
Rather, animate culture and legitimate authority must be created to give 
science meaning and direction and to curb its destructive impulses 
(Nietzsche 1969c, pp. 261-64, 311-13; 19696, p. 152). 
"All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as it is honest! So long as it 
believes in itself and does not play tricks on us!" Nietzsche (19696, pp. 
158-59) declared. While he preferred genuine Christian conviction to the 
new slave moralities, he felt that faith in God had already collapsed and 
that religion, like other creeds, is no longer practiced sincerely. In his 
view, the most obvious sign of decadence is that people regularly act 
according to beliefs they know are false. Nihilistic "forgery in ideals," 
ethical formality, and indolence prepare the way for a new type of tyr­
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anny, foreshadowed by Germany's peculiar mixture of reactionary con­
servatism, philosophic idealism, public welfare, delusions of national 
grandeur, anti-Semitism, and brute coercion. More generally, however, 
throughout the West, Socratic rationalization, in its most decadent stage, 
levels completely the particularities that give individuals and cultures 
strength and vitality. The sweeping exhaustion makes possible nightmar­
ish future regimes (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 310-13; 233; 19686, p. 75; 1968a, 
pp. 149-50). 
Cultural Rationalization contra Communication 
Everywhere language is sick, and the oppression of this tre­
mendous sickness weighs on the whole of human development. 
(Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations) 
Privileging aesthetic experience over rational action, Nietzsche subverted 
modern theory's largely normative and instrumental views of communi­
cation and social bonds. He held that genuine human relationships are 
rooted in mutual feelings and the body and depend on the "superabun­
dance of means of communication" offered by aesthetic sensibilities. By 
contrast, he treated language primarily as an instrument of social control. 
Being abstract and collective, "words" inevitably undermine the expres­
sion of the particularities that animate interpersonal ties. In intimate 
relationships, it is easy to detect that words fail to communicate ade­
quately "feelings, intentions, nuances, desires, and fears." But if one 
openly acknowledges these silences, he or she risks being branded as 
"strange" and "isolated"; superior beings' authenticity opens them to 
the predations of the herd (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 297-300; 19686, pp. 50, 
203-4, 275, 334, 358, 371, 427-28; 1966, p. 217). 
In Nietzsche's view, language produces "a separate world beside the 
other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it 
could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of 
it. . . . Man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of 
things as in aeternae veritates. ... He really thought that in language 
he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor of language was not 
so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he 
conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge 
of things" (Nietzsche 1986, p. 16). 
Treating words as mirrors of reality provides a comforting illusion of 
"certainty." This tendency obscures the social bases of language, reifies 
social conventions, and weakens capacities to imagine and create alterna­
tive conditions. Linguistic "abbreviations" cement obligatory social ties 
where "mutual agreement" about "feelings" is absent and the tendency 
to "let go" must be stemmed. Nietzsche held that language serves social 
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selection of the herd, keeping experiences, desires, impulses, and actions 
of weak persons within boundaries, inscribing strong individuals as col­
lective enemies, and redirecting rcssentiment into regimentation. Accord­
ingly, cultural rationalization makes this process of liquidating particu­
larity more effective and universal (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 100-102, 216-17; 
19686, pp. 3S7-S8, 380). 
Since Nietzsche was himself a master writer, his polemics about words 
per se are hyperbolic." The real target is Socratic culture's exceptionally 
abstract languages, rampant conceptual reifications, and impoverished 
aesthetic sensibilities. Nietzsche believed that the obsession with rational 
representation makes the body an inert target of disciplinary control. 
Adoration of concepts, theory, and reason makes the abstract signifier 
the ultimate object of knowledge. Purely formal concepts are treated 
as the "highest," "real," and "true" things, while sense experience is 
relegated to the degraded status of "appearance." Platonic ideas, Chris­
tian soul, Kantian things-in-themselves, and Newtonian atoms and time 
are all foundational reifications that "dehistoricize" the corporeal world 
and erect illusions of firm "grounds" for those who cannot face life 
without God and tradition or bear the weight of its conflictive choices 
and its "great dice game" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 287-90; 19686, p. 549; 
19686, pp. 35-37). 
Destroying Socratic culture's "objective" foundations (i.e., God and 
Truth), the latest phase of cultural rationalization greatly amplifies feel­
ings of uncertainty. The consequent desperate searching and clinging 
produces frenetic reification; fanatical new prejudices, religions, and poli­
tics appear alongside the most sterile intellectual formalisms. Mass cul­
ture's hastily formulated languages blur all difference and ambiguity 
(e.g., parties "transform their principles into great alfresco stupidities"). 
The proliferation of abstract signifiers, arising from diverse locations and 
detached from any sense of stable referents, contribute to increasingly 
mechanical, diffuse, and mindless regimentation. In this fashion, 
Nietzsche severed the links that modern theorists saw between rational­
ization and enhanced communication, social integration, and legitimate 
authority (Nietzsche 1983, p. 215; 1986, pp. 161-62; 1966, pp. 216-17; 
19686, pp. 357-58, 380-81). 
Subjectified Culture: Social Selves as Simulators 
The phenomenon of modern man has become wholly appear­
ance; he is not visible in what he represents but rather con­
cealed by it. (Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations) 
11 He advocated writing in a style that proves "one believes in an idea; not only thinks 
it but also feels it" (personal communication to Lou Andreas-Salomd, quoted in [1894] 
1988, pp. 77-78). 
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According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, 
durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master 
reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci­
pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were 
a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But 
there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef­
fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" 
(Nietzsche 19696, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" 
foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For 
example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap­
pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as 
causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets 
of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that 
subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re­
markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any 
exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" 
(Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). 
The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the 
longest time."1* He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or 
"foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with 
them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif­
ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, 
Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized 
occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica­
tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth­
ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so 
thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have 
trouble being anything but actors—"The role has actually become the 
character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas­
tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly 
amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ­
rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing 
overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts 
and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, 
say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 
316-17). 
Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to 
hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many 
roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff 
"puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? 
12 The important passages on actor and role in The Gay Science were added to the 
second edition in 1887 and, thus, reflect Nietzsche's mature thought. 
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A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an 
imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell 
the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the 
originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232— 
33, 259; 19696, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness 
and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of 
actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net­
works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be 
a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, 
pp. 93-94). 
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche 
(1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as 
one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock 
market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something.' 'Rather 
do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle 
all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to 
expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and 
overreaching and anticipating others." 
Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of 
ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that 
contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio­
cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. 
Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra­
tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to 
render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated 
versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am­
plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex­
ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir­
cumstances." Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." 
Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur­
gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely— 
a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." 
The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and 
untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant 
(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4). 
Sovereign Selves: Dissimulators/Perspectiva! Beings 
The age of Socratic man is over. (Nietzsche, The Birth of 
Tragedy) 
Opposing the tide of subjectified culture, Nietzsche envisioned a "sover­
eign" type of individual who is not taken over by roles but acts according 
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to his or her inherent bodily "intelligence" and "multiplicity." Sovereign 
individuals escape the social self's characteristic dualisms (e.g., mind/ 
body, inner/outer, and being/appearance) and consequent estrange­
ment. They "dissimulate" to establish "distance" from their roles, dis­
cerningly staging, watching, and concealing themselves in "good con­
science" to escape domestication, exert command, express benevolence 
and modesty, seek solitude, avert unnecessary conflicts, or just enjoy the 
freedom and playfulness of masks (Nietzsche 1986, p. 136; 1982a, p. 156; 
1974, pp. 130-33, 169, 266, 302-4, 316-17, 321; 19686, pp. 292-93; 
1966, p. 160; 19696, pp. 59-60). They "become those who we are— 
human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves 
laws, who create themselves" (Nietzsche 1974, p. 266). 
While always rare, sovereign individuals can be found in all sorts of 
settings and strata. For example, strong persons in subjugated groups 
(including, according to Nietzsche, lower classes, Jews, and women), 
hardened by continuous struggles with highly unfavorable circumstances, 
often become skilled dissimulators (Nietzsche 1974, p. 317). Cultural 
complexes, however, vary greatly with respect to resources for nurturing 
sovereign individuality. "Tragic culture" of ancient Greece (Odysseus 
was Nietzsche's prototypic dissimulator) was exceptionally rich in this 
regard, while Socratic culture is impoverished. Today, the "fittest" indi­
viduals are treated as the "most deviant" types and prime enemies of 
the herd. Even in this setting, however, a few survive by employing all 
their powers of dissimulation and self-mastery. Endless struggles against 
a vast array of homogenizing and coercing forces make them "strong as 
the devil." Thus, even highly negative conditions give rise to a small 
number of "exceptional human beings" (Nietzsche 19686, pp. 80, 460-
64; 1966, pp. 110-14, 137-39, 176-77; 1968a, pp. 118; 1969a, pp. 232; 
253-55). 
The current mixing of peoples and cultures draws out the worst in­
stincts of weak individuals, but makes sovereign types "stronger and 
richer than ever before." The experience of diverse values, norms, and 
ways of life makes them flexible, adaptable, multisided, and "increas­
ingly independent of any determinate milieu" (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 174— 
77). Nietzsche stated: "Like trees we grow . . . not in one place only but 
everywhere, not in one direction but equally upward and outward and 
inward and downward; our energy is at work simultaneously in the 
trunk, branches, and roots; we are no longer free to do only one particular 
thing, to he only one particular thing" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 332-33). 
This plural nature opens sovereign types to "the perspective character 
of existence"; they recognize that each person's body, biography, and 
location are unique optics, that superior culture originates from this 
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purely historical matrix, and that cultural experience is itself refracted 
by the same particularities. Sovereign individuals embrace the plurality 
of possible beings, experiences, and perspectives (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 
215, 336-37). The "highest" type of person, Nietzsche held, would have 
"the greatest multiplicity of drives in the relatively greatest strength that 
they can be endured." Being the "richest in contradictions," he or she 
would have "antennae for all types" of humanity (Nietzsche 19686, pp. 
150, 479, 504-19; 1966, pp. 50-51, 145-50, 160, 220-21, 226). 
Nietzschean perspectivism is sometimes interpreted as giving equal 
validity to all points of view (i.e., only abstract "difference" stands 
above an otherwise flattened plane). Nothing is further from Nietzsche's 
(e.g., 1969a, p. 280) position. He equated relativism with intellectual and 
ethical indolence and saw it to be at the root of the war on difference. 
The consequent eclipse of "distance," or will to distinguish between 
superior and inferior values and people, opens the way for demagoguery, 
fraud, and coercion. If values are leveled, how can one be expected 
to choose conditions and leaders favoring tolerance and nurturance of 
particularity? Diverse value preferences naturally arise from healthy bod­
ies and different social locations. But they also can reflect poor health 
and ressentiment. Therefore, all values should not be given equal valid­
ity. For this reason, Nietzsche called for a new "ordering of rank: not. . . 
an individualistic morality" (Nietzsche 19686, pp. 162, 197; 1966, pp. 
53-56, 148). 
Perspectivism is "a complex form of specificity" converse to the preva­
lent reification of abstract concepts. Nietzsche said, "One has to learn 
to see . . . habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things 
come to it, learning to defer judgement, to investigate and comprehend 
the individual case in all its aspects . . . not to react immediately to 
a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in one's 
control. ... In an attitude of hostile calm one will allow the strange, the 
novel of every kind to approach" (Nietzsche 1968a, p. 65). Engaging 
genuine difference requires a disciplined self-command, unknown to 
hasty, superficial simulators. Sovereign individuals are perspectival be­
ings, expressing rigor in observing, reflecting, and acting. Their "will to 
power" derives as much from their refined capacity to create distance, 
withhold response, and grasp particulars as from their vital instincts. 
Nietzsche did not reject science per se. Rather, his scathing attacks on 
positivist claims about science mirroring the world, revealing the mean­
ing of history, and replacing religion deconstructed the pseudoscientific 
subject (i.e., the disembodied eye spectating neutrally on an autonomous, 
object world). He called for a more open, active, and specific way of 
knowing, stressing "experimental" understanding of human action and 
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its consequences.13 Perspectivist science rejects the "world of truth" in 
"reverence" for all that "lies beyond" its "horizon" and for life's "rich 
ambiguity" It challenges reifications, clarifies the limits of rationality, 
opens multiple realities to view, and enhances particularity (Nietzsche 
1974, p. 335; 19686, p. 340; 1968a, pp. 122-26, 162-65, 170-75). 
Nietzsche had this position in mind when he spoke of science being a 
sign of "a higher multiplicity of culture," and praised its "disciplining 
of the intellect, clarity, and severity in matters of intellectual conscience, 
noble coolness, and freedom of the intellect" (Nietzsche 19686, p. 246; 
1968a, p. 163). 
Even perspectivist science, however, cannot solve the problem of So-
cratic rationalization, which endlessly strips away "veils," finds nothing 
underneath, and levels differences. Without proper direction, science 
feeds nihilism and cultural exhaustion. But if science is not an indepen­
dent worldview, what values should guide it? Here, Nietzsche returned 
to the body and cultural sublimation of drives in the cause of "ascending 
life." Aesthetic sensibilities and art, he argued, are the real enemies of 
the rational subject and the ultimate source of individual and cul­
tural vitality. Science's "will to truth" originates from the ascetic ideal, 
while art derives from a "will to deception" with "a good conscience" 
(Nietzsche 19696, pp. 153-56; 19826, p. 682). Nietzsche asserted that 
"we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and blissful 
art lest we lose our freedom above things that our ideal demands of 
us. . . . We should be able also to stand above morality—and not only 
to stand with anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and 
falling any moment, but also to float above it and play. How then could 
we possibly dispense with art—and with the fool?" (Nietzsche 1974, p. 
164). Calling for a "lighter," freer individuality, comfortable with all of 
its disguises and multiplicity, Nietzsche gave ultimate priority to the 
uninhibited foreground of life (i.e., playful dissimulation and festival) 
over rational culture (Nietzsche 19826, p. 683; also 1974, p. 38). 
Although ultimately subordinate to aesthetics, the "will to truthful­
ness" still has an important place. Nietzsche stated, "This will to mere 
appearance, to simplification, to masks, to cloaks ... to the surface . . . 
is countered by that sublime inclination of the seeker after knowledge 
who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness, with a will 
which is a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste" 
(Nietzsche 1966, pp. 160-61). More than ever, Nietzsche believed, the 
time calls for a will to truthfulness strong enough to endure seeing "real­
13 Nietzsche implied a pragmatic, rather than a representational theory of scientific 
knowledge. For example, he spoke about expanding the purview of mathematized 
science, "not in the faith that this will lead us to know things but in order to determine 
our human relation to things" (Nietzsche 1974, p. 215). 
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ity as it is," in all its multiplicity, chaotic uncertainty, and harshness, 
whatever the costs. This is the heart of his "immoralism" and "suspi­
cion." Shortly before going mad, he stated, "How much truth does a 
spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? More and more that became 
for me the real measure of value" (Nietzsche 1969a, pp. 218, 327-31). 
The sovereign individual's inclinations for "Dionysian" abandonment 
and stoical "responsibility" are at "war," but passionate vision and disci­
plined truthfulness are both needed to face "open seas" and great tasks. 
After Modernity: The Permanent Cultural War 
Politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all 
power structures of the old society will have been exploded. 
(Nietzsche, Ecce Homo) 
Nietzsche viewed his own era to be parallel to Socrates' time; that is, a 
period of cultural disintegration ripe for epochal rupture (Nietzsche 1974, 
pp. 303-4). Imagine a sporting, intellectual, or artistic pursuit without 
standards to judge good from bad performance, rank different perform­
ers, and distinguish genuine innovation and creativity from simulation 
and fraud. Nietzsche argued that just such an evaporation of legitimate 
authority is already the case in mass culture, politics, and most other 
important areas of public life. In his view, the tendency of modern theo­
rists to abstractly harmonize irresolvable contradictions and conjure up 
societal consensus made matters worse. Since all serious cultural achieve­
ment demands stretching, striving, and struggling, the only way out of 
the crisis is to restore the matrix for creative individuality and cultural 
vitality—"strong opponents," resistances, and genuine differences (e.g., 
Nietzsche 19686, p. 197). 
In a famous passage, Nietzsche called on people to "live dangerously," 
to wage "war" with their "peers and themselves." But he envisioned 
war being transformed into a "search for knowledge" and fought over 
"ideas and their consequences" (Nietzsche 1974, p. 228). By contrast to 
the nationalist emphasis on the primacy of political power, he argued for 
subordinating politics to culture. Nietzsche believed that genuine cultural 
selection is a generative force in all epochs, but, as with Socratic culture, 
its productive potential is blunted by the herd type of social selection and 
its consequent political suppression of creative individuals, ideas, and 
modes of life. Conversely, he imagined a post-Socratic epoch where un­
constrained cultural selection would be the hegemonic logic of sociocul-
tural production and reproduction. Rather than regimentation and coer­
cion, cultural leaders and goods would achieve dominance by virtue of 
their "superiority" in open cultural competition and, thus, ultimately, 
by their contribution to "ascending life." The new cultural complex 
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would intensify, rather than suppress, clashes between strongly held val­
ues, vital lived experiences, and creative personalities. This requires in­
stitutional spheres that facilitate conflictive perspectives and unparalleled 
levels of freedom of inquiry, taste, and lifestyle. Permanent war between 
divergent exemplars, ideas, norms, values, and worldviews means that 
the culture complex would itself be continually open to contestation and 
reconstruction (Nietzsche 19686, pp. 81-82, 346, 395-96; 1968a, pp. 
21-27, 44; 1969a, 231-33; Kaufmann 1974, pp. 386-89). 
Nietzsche's conceptions of post-Socratic individuality and cultural se­
lection constitute an ethos for cultural leadership and domination. Only 
sovereign types have the required strength, creativity, and lack of inhibi­
tions to be full participants in the cultural war and to create new ultimate 
values. Nietzsche conceived of the new order as a "foundation or scaf­
folding" for this "higher" type of being and task, not as a means to 
achieve universal freedom and equality. In his view, egalitarian ideals 
serve cultural mediocrity and mass discipline. Although Nietzsche's anti­
democratic polemics were aimed primarily against moralizing, leveling, 
and regimenting forces that weaken individuality, his elitism still has 
highly ambiguous elements. For example, he spoke of the "highest men" 
living "beyond" all rulers and social bonds and of the possible case of a 
single individual justifying a "whole millennia." It is easy to see how 
such ideas could be perverted by the types of tyrants he feared were on 
the horizon (Nietzsche 19686, pp. 162, 197, 518-19; 1966, pp. 174-77, 
201-2; 19696, pp. 25-26). 
Yet Nietzsche held that weak, timid individuals—not the strong—fear 
difference, "love harsh judgments," and are predisposed to violence. By 
contrast, he thought that sovereign types, imbued with perspectivism 
and an aristocratic (cultural) warrior ethic, would oppose regimentation: 
"reproaching, punishing, and attempting] to improve others" (Nietzsche 
1982a, pp. 139, 175; 1974, pp. 232-33, 254). In his view, the challenge of 
the age is to nurture new cultural leadership capable of resisting rampant 
demagoguery, chauvinism, toadyism, and coercion. Nietzsche wanted a 
cultural complex that would escape later modernity's excessive moralism, 
inwardness, intolerance, and the all-pervasive concern with control. He 
believed that genuine difference or particularity, taken seriously, would 
favor more free, natural, and plural ways of life. 
Nietzsche's prescriptions that life ought to be an "experiment of the 
seeker of knowledge . . . not a duty, not a calamity, not trickery" and 
that society ought to be an "experiment" and "not a 'contract'" are 
telling (Nietzsche 1974, p. 255; 1969c, p. 229). Sharing the faith of radical 
democratic thinkers he opposed, he said yes to human nature and no to 
"foundations." His declaration that "man" must be "overcome," re­
cently echoed by Foucault, calls for an end of the subject and an "unin­
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hibited, a very uninhibited hand" (Nietzsche 19696, p. 159). But his 
normative appeal to a potential stratum of individuals capable of bring­
ing the new cultural epoch into being the day after tomorrow is problem­
atic. Other than creativity, diversity, and self-mastery, post-Socratic val­
ues are an open question left to aesthetic sensibilities and vitalistic forces. 
From his perspective, however, the charge that ethical foundations are 
lacking is a moralistic reflex of the moribund Socratic subject; its flick­
ering desire for security must be expunged. Inverting Plato's allegory of 
the cave, Nietzsche (1974, p. 167) declared, "After Buddha was dead, his 
shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome 
shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may be caves for 
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.—And we—we 
still have to vanquish his shadow, too." 
NIETZSCHEANISMS: NIETZSCHE'S ANTISOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL 
THEORY 
I am a Doppelganger, I have a "second" face in addition to 
the first. And perhaps also a third. (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo) 
Numerous and varied indirect appropriations preclude an inclusive map­
ping of Nietzsche's impact on social theory. However, three important 
currents can be identified. First, certain modern theorists employ his 
ideas to moderate exaggerated claims about rationality, science, social 
consensus, and progress within their own tradition. Although they ex­
press ambivalence about modern society, they reject Nietzsche's argu­
ments about cultural exhaustion and attempt to strengthen modern the­
ory by making it more reflexive. Another group of appropriators, on the 
left, sense a depletion of resources for progressive reform or revolution. 
They aim to go beyond modern theory and create new approaches that 
resuscitate emancipatory hopes or individual or sociocultural particular­
ity. Because they do not entirely sever their ties to emancipatory theory, 
these positions remain at the border of modern theory, even when they 
are intended as postmodern departures from it. A third type of appropria­
tion calls for a revolution from the radical right. These positions break 
sharply with modern theory, subordinating individuality to remytholo-
gized ideas of culture, nation, and state. 
Nietzsche and Modern Social Theory 
Weber and Durkheim are usually treated as the most important founders 
in the sociological canon. Weber was the leading figure among a genera­
tion of German thinkers influenced by Nietzsche. Conversely, Durkheim 
is the leading representative of the type of French sociologism that 
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Nietzsche decried and belongs to a long line of thinkers engaged and 
criticized by new cultural theory. Discussion of the two thinkers will help 
draw out Nietzsche's challenge within modern theory. 
Nietzschean ideas pervade Weber's corpus, even though they are 
mostly implicit and hard to isolate.14 For example, qualifying his ideal-
types, he held that in "the great majority of cases actual action goes on 
in a state of inarticulate half consciousness or actual unconsciousness 
of its subjective meaning" (Weber [1921] 1968, p. 21). He stressed the 
important role irrationality plays in social life and implied that most 
persons cannot face the uncertainty and complexity inhering in a world 
of "irreconcilably antagonistic values." Only stronger individuals have 
the personal resources to cope with the full implications of the "warring 
gods" and ultimate meaninglessness of history and to take responsibility 
for creating their own meaning (Weber [1904-17] 1949, p. 18; [1919] 
1958c). Like Nietzsche, Weber stressed the centrality of cultural analysis, 
selection, and elites, the importance of local, individual, and regional 
particularities, and the towering threats posed by mass discipline, domi­
nation, and rationalization. Also, he warned about welfare institutions 
making people passive objects of control, socialism recreating a more re­
pressive version of ancient Egypt or China, and instrumentalities leveling 
genuine culture.15 Weber came to these positions by his own path, but his 
arrival was facilitated by Nietzschean ideas and the broader agenda they 
set for social theory (e.g., Baier 1981-82; Hennis 1988, pp. 158-61). 
Nietzschean themes appear in Weber's critiques of crude representa­
tional thinking, especially as manifested in the tendency to mistake heu­
ristic devices for reality. He spoke of the hairline between "science" and 
"faith," and took a perspectivist position toward knowledge in his highly 
qualified defense of "objectivity." For Weber, the values that make 
science "worthwhile," define its "problems," give it "direction," and 
generate "belief" in its efficacy originate outside its borders in life's 
"irrational reality." He held that modern science must be grasped in 
light of Western culture's "optimistic faith" in rationality, which he 
14 On Weber and Nietzsche, see e.g., Fleischmann (1964), Turner (1982), Kent (1983), 
Eden (1983, 1987), Schroeder (1987), Hennis (1987; 1988, pp. 146-62), Bloom (1988, 
pp. 194-240), Goldman (1988, 1992), Liebersohn (1988), Mommsen (1974, 1989), Scaff 
(1989), Strong (1992), Warren (1992). 
15 For example, after singing praises to unadorned life in Oklahoma Territory, Weber 
(quoted in M. Weber [1926] 1975, p. 293) stated: "Too bad; in a year this place will 
look like Oklahoma [City], that is, like any other American city. With almost light­
ening speed everything that stands in the way of capitalistic culture is being crushed." 
The same powerful sentiments appear at the end of the Protestant Ethic (Weber 
[1904] 1958a, pp. 181-83). 
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considered deeply "problematic" (Weber 1949, pp. 71-112). He attacked 
positivist claims about self-grounding science and conjuring up the ideal 
out of the real. After "Nietzsche's devastating criticism of those 'last 
men' who 'invented happiness,"' Weber argued (1958c, pp. 143, 148), 
how can anyone believe the "big children" who still see science as a 
"way to happiness" and to escape decision?16 Like Nietzsche, he called 
for a modest version of science that, by coming to terms with its limits, 
faces realities without moralizing illusions. Compare Nietzsche's (e.g., 
1966, pp. 49-50; 1969a, pp. 218, 312, 328-31) views about living "with­
out illusions," enduring "disagreeable truths," and being "strong 
enough" to conceive "reality as it is" to Marianne Weber's (1975, pp. 
662-63, 681-84) comments on her husband's heroic "realism" or "illu­
sion-free illumination of the various roots of existence" (see also Weber 
19586; 1958c). 
But remaining in the orbit of modern theory, Weber diverged from 
Nietzsche on many issues. For example, Weber rejected his view of res-
sentiment as a general source of religious ethics. Like Nietzsche, Weber 
detailed the awesome homogenizing power of modern rationalization and 
even traced its ultimate roots to Western antiquity and early Christianity. 
But Weber also held that rationalization sharpens the differences between 
the various spheres of life and value and that it produces unparalleled 
space for autonomous individuality. It is significant that he found highly 
aestheticized culture repellent and feared its sociopolitical conse­
quences.1' Compare Nietzsche's positions about the primacy of art to 
"unmusical" Weber's (1958a, pp. 155-56) appeal to stronger individuals 
to set to work, understanding that disenchantment has permanently 
driven the sublime out of all but their most intimate circles. Addition­
ally, Weber's "realism" about political elites and power contradicts 
Nietzsche's hopes about post-Socratic cultural selection and substantively 
legitimate authority. Weber was no Nietzschean, but he selectively de­
ployed Nietzsche's ideas to challenge modern theorists to recognize the 
limits of rationality and rethink their practices accordingly. He ultimately 
affirmed sociology, the normative potentialities of modernity (e.g., "re­
sponsibility"), and liberal institutions, but he was still highly ambivalent 
"A S ee Stephen A. Kent (1983) on Parsons's exclusion of Weber's reference to 
Nietzsche's "last men" just before the famous passage about "specialists without 
spirit, sensualists without heart" in the English translation of the Protestant Ethic. 
Kent shows how subtle Nietzschean themes can be overlooked. 
s? See Marianne Weber's (1975, pp. 318-19, 372—80, 455-64) account of her spouse's 
reaction to the Nietzschean poet Stefan George and Freudo-Nietzscheanism of Otto 
Gross. 
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about the prospects of democracy.18 In modern theory, Nietzschean ideas 
are often entwined with somber or tragic visions about modernity and 
with pessimistic views about the possibility for stronger democracy.19 
Although Durkheim warned vigorously about anomie, social inequal­
ity, expansive state power, and the erroneous equation of material with 
social progress, he still implied that rational culture develops progres­
sively and provides fresh resources for coping with crises. In particular, 
he argued that norms and values affirming the individual's "personal 
dignity" are growing stronger, more exact, and more "universal." Be­
cause complex interdependence depends on individuals freely gravitating 
to roles consistent with their native ability, it calls forth increased empha­
sis on individual rights and equal opportunity. Moreover, modern culture 
has much greater "autonomy" from its material "substrata" and much 
enhanced capacities for rational representation. Ideas and values can be 
signified more clearly to larger numbers of people than ever before (see 
e.g., Durkheim [1893] 1964, pp. 171-73, 287-91, 321, 345, 329-50, 381-
88; [1912] 1965, pp. 479-96; [1924] 1953, pp. 23-34; [1898] 1973a; [1925] 
1973d, pp. 1-14, 114-16, 265, 277-81). Like Nietzsche, Durkheim spoke 
of a "spiritualization" of culture. But he celebrated precisely what 
Nietzsche attacked, arguing that learning "to think and act with con­
cepts" liberates people from the "yoke of the organism" (i.e., "passion" 
and "senses"), putting them under the regulation of higher "social 
causes."20 In Durkheim's view, cultural rationalization enhances potenti­
alities for individual autonomy, social diversity, and "less imperative" 
social control (Durkheim 1964, pp. 287-91, 299, 302, 321, 333, 345-46, 
349; 1965, pp. 307-8, 481-82; 19736, pp. 95-126). 
18 While arguing that Weber's "liberal notion" of society "qualified" his view of 
Nietzsche, Mommsen (1988, pp. 172-75; 1974, pp. 382-453) still claims that Weber's 
ambivalence about democracy opened the way for Carl Schmitt's protofascist appro­
priation. 
19 Daniel Bell's Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism provides a good example of 
contemporary modern theory with a strong Nietzschean flavor. While opposing 
Nietzschean sensibilities, Bell gives primacy to culture, criticizes degraded cultural 
standards (i.e., the "eclipse of distance"), and attacks a cultural leadership that ex­
erts hegemony through radical democratic ideology ("adversary culture"). Bell (1978, 
p. xxix) stated that "we stand, I believe, with a clearing ahead of us. The exhaustion 
of Modernism, the aridity of Communist life, the tedium of the unrestrained self, and 
the meaninglessness of monolithic political chants, all indicate that a long era is coming 
to a slow close." Bell's quasi-Nietzschean argument is reminiscent of Foucault's 
(1989, p. 327) point about his own "anti-Nietzschean theses" being "nevertheless 
Nietzschean." 
20 The genders, however, do not fare equally in this process. Durkheim held that 
women, having less developed brains, are more emotional and less capable of abstract 
thinking (the resulting gender division of labor supposedly facilitates conjugal solidar­
ity; e.g., Durkheim 1964, pp. 54-63; [1897] 1966, pp. 166, 215-16, 270-74, 341-42, 
385-86; Roth 1989-90; Lehmann 1991, 1993, 1994). 
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Durkheim favored increasing moral regulation of the "body" to stem 
uncontrolled desire and to halt the dissipation of morality and democracy. 
Like Nietzsche, he saw priestly asceticism as "an integral part of 
all human culture," but he viewed it very affirmatively, imploring 
that "moral" life (i.e., "real living") be given primacy over "art" ("a 
game"). "We must see people as they are," he argued, in "their ugliness 
and wretchedness—if we want to help them. Art faces the other way" 
(Durkheim 1965, pp. 307-8; 1973, pp. 271-73). Durkheim wanted to 
employ science and moral education to discipline aesthetic impulses and 
tie the individual's "whole being" to society. He believed that increased 
moral regulation was needed to avert social disintegration and an authori­
tarian state. However, his unhesitant, celebratory tone about the "hyper-
spirituality," "great voice," "great collective ends," "liberating depen­
dence," "infinitely richer and higher reality" and "love" of the "social" 
directly contradicts Nietzsche's "uninhibited hand" (Durkheim 1964, 
pp. 51-53, 239-40, 287-91, 329-50; 1966, pp. 246-57; 1965, pp. 
355-56, 481-96; 1953, pp. 23-34, 54-59, 72, 84-85; 19736, pp. 39, 
72-75, 100-102, 251, 271-77). 
While these brief comments on Durkheim are necessarily one-sided, 
they illustrate tendencies of modern theory that come under attack by 
Nietzschean antisociology. From this vantage point, Durkheim erases 
the body, elevates Socratic conceptualism into a normative ideal, and 
legitimates the nascent welfare state's control mechanisms. Given Durk-
heim's active role in the Third Republic, it is not surprising that younger 
Bergsonians and Nietzscheans considered him to be the scourge of the 
regime's alleged joyless rationalization and regimentation (Hughes 1977, 
pp. 336-91; Lepenies 1988, pp. 47-90). More nuanced modern positions 
by recent theorists, from Talcott Parsons to Jurgen Habermas, moderate 
Durkheim's moralizing inclinations but maintain similar links between 
cultural rationalization, representation, autonomous individuality, and 
democracy. New cultural theorists charge that these quasi-evolutionary 
visions of progressive cultural rationalization reflect the theorists' own 
values, obscure cultural exhaustion, and, ultimately, justify liquidation 
of particularity. 
Nietzscheanism on the Cultural Left and Postmodern Divide 
The cultural left has employed Nietzschean ideas in diverse critiques of 
modern theory. For example, the radical socialist Kurt Eisner used them 
to attack orthodox Marxism; Otto Gross linked them to Freud, expres­
sionism, and matriarchal communism; and Helen Stocker employed them 
in radical feminism (see Thomas 1986, pp. 17-25, 80-95; Taylor 1990, 
pp. 89-116). Randolph Bourne's ([1917] 1964) sharp Nietzschean attack 
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on his teacher, John Dewey, is illustrative. He felt that his mentor's 
support for the United States' entry into World War I was a capitulation 
to the power system following from his instrumentalism and lack of aes­
thetic "vision." Conversely, Bourne saw Nietzsche as a hammer against 
repressive rationalization. Marianne Weber (1975, pp. 319, 455-64) de­
scribes similar tensions between her spouse and the Nietzschean poet 
Stefan George and his avant-garde circle. Like Dewey and Bourne, the 
split was over rational culture and the war. Nietzsche's passionate em­
phasis on aesthetically overcoming bourgeois life had strong appeal for 
those seeking radical alternatives, during culturally pessimistic times 
(Thomas 1986, pp. 96-111; Peukert 1992, pp. 86-106; Aschheim 1992, 
pp. 71-76). 
On the cultural left, Nietzschean ideas are found in heterodox fusions. 
For example, Bourne ([1914] 1981, p. 238) described his "paradoxical 
desire for Tolstoyan ends through Nietzschean means; socialism, dy­
namic social religion through the ruthless application of scientific ma­
terialism." In the 1930s, French ultra-leftist, Georges Bataille, fused 
Nietzsche with Marx, de Sade, Freud, and Durkheim. Celebrating the 
"heterogeneous," this antibourgeois aesthete explored extreme experi­
ences and forbidden behaviors, including violence. Nietzsche and Marx 
both appear in Ernst Bloch's redemptive revolutionism and quasireli-
gious philosophy of hope (Bataille 1985, 1992; Habermas 1987a, pp. 
212-21; Aschheim 1992, pp. 182-84, 229-30, 286-95). Nietzschean ideas 
helped Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno ([1944] 1972, p. 44) shift 
the focus of their critique from capitalism to Western rationality. They 
held that new capacities for imposing terror, deflecting criticism, and 
regimenting workers (i.e., Stalinism, fascism, corporate capitalism) are 
rooted deeply in Western civilization and require a fundamental cultural 
critique. Herbert Marcuse spoke of global convergence toward "one-
dimensional," "advanced industrial society," which manipulates needs 
so effectively that "negativity" and "opposition" are eliminated. Ap­
plauding Nietzsche's attack on the repression of pleasure and ecstatic 
experience, he held that "artistic alienation" offers a "remembrance of 
freedom in the totality of oppression." If rationalization has become a 
singular logic of domination, the Enlightenment project of emancipation 
and progress and modern theory must be radically rethought. For this 
reason, the cultural left gravitated to Nietzsche (Marcuse [1945] 1993, 
pp. 180, 195; 1964; 1966, pp. 119-24, 232). 
Rising to popularity in the wake of May 1968 radicalism and weakened 
Marxism, French poststructuralists engaged a diverse lineage, including 
Descartes, Kant, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Husserl, Bataille, Bachelard, 
Saussure, Heidegger, Levinas, Sartre, Levi-Strauss, and Althusser. But 
Nietzsche has special prominence in this tradition. For example, Fou-
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cault proclaimed his "fundamental Nietzscheanism," which is easy to 
detect in his inquiries about the human sciences and discipline. Although 
his analyses of "homogenization" and "normalization" have sociological 
facets, his positions on the body, power/knowledge, perspectivism, sub­
ject, and difference give his work a distinct Nietzschean tone. Foucault 
explored connections between Western morality, rationality, and domi­
nation, exposing disciplinary forces operating in spheres and practices 
generally presumed to serve human needs. Like Nietzsche, he held that 
discipline has been radically diffused, during the last two centuries. The 
new "micro-physics" of power reduces reliance on visible, centralized 
violent force, substituting a vast array of microscopic disciplinary mecha­
nisms and much more sweeping controls over the body. In his view, 
normative languages of solidarity and interdependence tame the body 
and serve the new system of "micro powers." In Nietzschean fashion, 
he embraced an "aesthetics of existence," stressing individuals artfully 
shaping their lives and appreciating diversity (Foucault 1973, p. 342; 
1979; 1989, pp. 249, 311, 325-30; 1984; 1990; Ferry and Renaut 1990, 
pp. 119-21; Best and Kellner 1991, pp. 34-75; Miller 1993). 
Jacques Derrida (1976, p. 19) acknowledges Nietzsche's substantial 
contribution to his own views about liberating the "signifier" from 
"truth or the primary signified" and decomposing the subject/object and 
appearance/reality dualisms into a centerless, relational web of signifiers 
governed by the free "play of differences." Like Nietzsche, he stresses 
the centrality of language in cultural domination, and his ideas of textu-
ality and differance are opposed to the workings of this process. Derrida's 
moves subvert modern theory's presuppositions about representation, 
communication, and social integration. With Foucault, moreover, he 
criticizes sociological conceptions of concentrated, macroscopic power, 
arguing that they ignore pervasive disciplinary forces operating as "de­
centralized and heterogeneous microphenomena." He states "that one 
must start, as Nietzsche doubtless did, from difference in order to accede 
to force and not vice versa." In Nietzschean style, Derridean deconstruc-
tion attacks cultural homogenization and celebrates particularity (Derrida 
1981, 1982; 1988, p. 149; Berman 1988, pp. 199-222). 
Nietzschean ideas about language and homogenization also appear in 
Jean Baudrillard's grim vision of total semiotic control. In his view, 
television, computers, and other innovations in information and image 
production reconstitute cultural experience cybernetically. Today's hy-
perreality is an all-encompassing whirl of aleatory signifiers, a completely 
one-dimensional plane that neutralizes all modes of distancing oneself 
from the immediacy of cultural experience. Critique merely shores up 
the failing reality principle (i.e., the illusion that realities underlie appear­
ances and signifiers have referents). Even art loses its critical negativity. 
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Ubiquitous "simulation" dissolves the social, power, politics, subjectiv­
ity, and history. Calling for a total break with modern theory, Baudril-
lard holds that accepting culture as only surface (i.e., approaching it with 
"indifference," "fascination," and receptivity to "seduction") is the 
only escape route from the current phase of total cultural domination 
(Baudrillard 1983a, 19836, 1987, 1990). 
In broader postmodern currents of new cultural theory, Nietzsche is 
often mentioned as an ally and precursor.21 Nietzschean themes are per­
vasive; postmodernists usually favor innovative, fractal, discordant, aes­
thetic styles of expression over conventional representation, perspectivist 
over objectivist theories of knowledge, and nonrational over rational 
visions of culture. Nietzschean motifs are prominent in their arguments 
about the role of language in cultural domination, critiques of the thera­
peutic state, affirmations of multicultural differences, and claims about 
problematic presuppositions, unexplored areas, and marginalized voices 
in modern theory. Also, their playful attacks on moralistic ideolo­
gies, positivism, parochial cultural biases, and intellectual canons have 
a Nietzschean thrust. 
Because the cultural left does not completely cut its ties to emancipa­
tory strains of modern theory, its adherents diverge from Nietzsche in 
important respects. For example, even in the Frankfurt school's most 
pessimistic phase, concepts such as "negative dialectics," and "total 
administration," or theory as a Flaschenpost (message in a bottle) had 
traces of their Marxian roots. Poststructuralists and postmodernists reject 
emancipatory theory outright, but their visions of radically egalitarian 
heterotopias are hardly Nietzschean. In particular, their semiotic attacks 
on the hierarchical facets of language manifest a muted version of the 
egalitarian, pluralist thread of left-leaning modern theory. Moreover, 
these thinkers sometimes express an extreme relativism, epitomizing 
what Nietzsche considered to be the "nuthouse" of liberal modernism. 
Generally, poststructuralists and postmodernists ignore Nietzsche's ideas 
about restoring authority, hierarchy, and cultural domination under a 
new rank order of values and leadership. They embrace his Dionysian 
side apart from his affirmations of severity of spirit, self-discipline, and 
science. Leaving sovereign individuality behind, these positions some­
times dissolve persons into an aleatory play of signifiers and desires. For 
example, the individual disappears completely in Baudrillard's vortex of 
signs. His points about resisting semiotic control through "hyperconfor-
mist simulation" or utter "indifference" and returning to ritual and myth 
suggest a much more ambiguous future than Nietzsche's post-Socratic 
21 See Gooding-Williams (1987), Strong (1988, pp. 310-18), Herman (1988), Koelb 
(1990), Shrift (1990), and Owen (1992, pp. 133-34) on Nietzsche and postmodernism. 
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scenario. One-sided aestheticism and amoral fascination blur differences 
between right and left. 
Radical Right Nietzscheanism 
The political directions of Nietzscheanism's highly aestheticized anti-
bourgeois, antidemocratic, and irrationalist themes are highly ambiguous 
and pliable. Georges Sorel employed them in arguments about the purify­
ing powers of violence, war, and mass mobilization (he can be considered 
a precursor to both communist and fascist ideology); Italian futurists used 
them in their nationalist aesthetic of technology and violence; Ludwig 
Klages fused them with myth, anti-individualism, and anti-Semitism; the 
German youth movement integrated them into a volkisch conception of 
national cultural renewal; and Rudolf Laban applied them in ecstatic 
dance forms presented first in avant-garde Ascona and later to serve the 
Nazi regime (Aschheim 1992, pp. 51-84, 133; Hughes 1977, pp. 161-82, 
339-40). During World War I, Scheler, Sombart, and others invoked 
Nietzsche to glorify German nationalism (e.g., Staude 1967, pp. 63-94; 
Thomas 1986, pp. 96-111; Aschheim 1992, pp. 113-17, 144-48, 153). 
After the war, as Aschheim holds, the "mythologized Germanic 
Nietzsche" became the most important source of inspiration, vision, and 
intellectual legitimation for the resurgent radical right (pp. 153-63; Herf 
1986). 
Nietzschean themes pervaded Ernst Junger's masculinist celebration 
of the community of the trenches, expressing magical fascination with 
the beauty of war, violence, pain, and death. He deplored bourgeois 
democracy's "feminine" egalitarianism, welfare provisions, and sacrifice 
of adventure for security. Imagining collective transcendence of bour­
geois mediocrity, he portrayed workers being forged into a technocratic 
apparatus and acting unhesitatingly together in service of higher cultural 
goals. His enchanted protofascist vision justified mass regimentation on 
its own immanent aesthetic bases. According to Jiinger, persons over­
come bourgeois estrangement by giving up their individuality and partici­
pating in a recovery of national cultural particularity (Jiinger [1931] 1993; 
Huyssen 1993; Sokel 1993; Zimmerman 1990, pp. 46-65). 
Heidegger illustrates the ambiguity and the fluid borders of Nietz­
scheanism. Many facets of his work anticipate postmodern positions. 
French poststructuralists came to Nietzsche through his writings, and 
Heideggarian themes abound in their work. It is possible to. evaluate 
aspects of Heidegger's philosophy and social theory apart from his poli­
tics and fuse them to positions with entirely different sociopolitical direc­
tions. Yet, even when his complicity with the Nazi regime is put aside, 
the protofascist themes in his work are still very strong. Like Jiinger, 
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Heidegger collectivized Nietzsche, albeit in an antitechnological vision 
of the Volk. Praising Nietzsche as the most advanced thinker of the era, 
Heidegger transforms sovereign individuality h la Jiinger. He saw the 
Ubermensch as neither individual nor mass, but as a "type" of the "same 
coinage," prefigured in "Prussian soldiery and the Jesuit order." In the 
same text Heidegger (1991a, pp. 99-100) embraced Nietzsche's "mascu­
line aesthetics," implying that it embraces yet points beyond Wagner's 
"collective artwork"; that is, which "should be a celebration of the 
national community" and "the religion." Such aesthetics have "redemp­
tive" power, generating a "pure state of feeling" that lifts the individual 
out of his or her prosaic existence (see also Heidegger 19916, pp. 77-91; 
Zimmerman 1990, pp. 34-112). 
Hans Freyer's widely read Revolution from the Right (1931) argued 
that the working class is thoroughly integrated into "industrial society," 
making genuine revolution from the left impossible. Breaking with "re­
actionary" conservatives as well as with the left, he called for a new 
right that would unite the nation across class lines and assert the collec­
tive identity and interests of the Volk (Muller 1987). Freyer, and others 
on the radical right, wanted an entirely new type of culture and society. 
Like Nietzsche, they saw liberalism, socialism, and all democratic ideolo­
gies to be part of a universal process of instrumental rationalization that 
steamrolls everything in its path and produces everywhere lifeless, joy­
less, economistic, homogenized mediocrity. On a global scale, the lure of 
"good plumbing," material interest, security, and faceless administra­
tion levels culture and produces weak, interchangeable, nihilistic people. 
The far right argued, however, that the German nation had not yet 
completely lost its original essence, vitality, and particularity (i.e., Volks-
geist or cultural totality). But the legacy is gravely threatened by corro­
sive rationalization, spreading outward, like an infectious disease, from 
imperialistic centers where such leveling is already completely victorious 
(i.e., England, the United States, and Russia).22 
The radical right envisioned a Middle European, sociopolitical regime 
unified by the recovery of the German nation's distinctive mythic, vi-
talist, intuitive, pagan cultural roots. This move aimed to break with 
Christianity's universal logic of rationalization and homogenization. But 
the radical right also called for Raum to preserve and cultivate the heri­
tage of the Volk. The cultural survival of spatially dispersed German-
speaking people depended on their being fused into a singular political 
will capable of creating a strong state with sufficient territory. Major 
22 Hans Freyer's former doctoral student, Ernest Manheim, has provided very helpful 




theorists of the radical right saw Nazism merely as the start of a much 
more profound cultural awakening of the Volk. Usually they avoided 
direct participation in the movement or distanced themselves from it 
after initial involvement. While they contributed significantly to the cli­
mate that produced Nazism, their positions appear to be relatively inde­
pendent of its explicit politics. The consequent ambiguity opens their 
thought to diverse fusions, even with approaches on the cultural left. 
However, many lesser thinkers, following in their tracks, made Nietzsche 
into a totem of the regime; even Hitler paid homage in an official visit 
to the Nietzsche archives (Baumler 1931; Muller 1987; Lepenies 1988, 
pp. 334-49; Aschheim 1992, pp. 232-314). 
Allan Bloom (1988, p. 222), argued that "today virtually every 
Nietzschean . . . is a leftist," but his own Nietzschean themes contradict 
this claim. More important, radical right Nietszcheanism is resurgent in 
Europe. For example, Junger is once again a widely read and honored 
figure. His work has a very contemporary texture and is seen as being 
precursosry to postmodernist representation (Sokel 1993). There is also a 
renaissance of radical right interest in Heidegger, Klages, and Carl 
Schmitt. And, as they did in Weimar, radical right reading groups and 
clubs have proliferated again. Writers such as Gunther Maschke, Heiner 
Muller, Armin Mohler, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist revive 
the distinction between culture and civilization, virulent antagonism to 
bourgeois mediocrity, and idea of a revolution from the right. Some 
of these thinkers appropriate poststructuralist themes and make other 
adjustments aimed at reaching wider audiences." The sociopolitical cli­
mate—arising from neoliberal "shock-therapy," erosion of social democ­
racy, pervasive conflicts over ethnicity, religion, and immigration, and 
seeming obsolescence of postwar ideologies—provides grist for radical 
right critiques of capitalism and democracy (Habermas 1989; Aschheim 
1992, pp. 306-7; Huyssen 1993; Neaman 1993; Dahl 1994)/4 
23 See Piccone (1993-94) and Benoist (1993-94) for very interesting discussion of posi­
tions of the French new right. The entire issue of Telos (no. 98/99), where these articles 
appear, deals with the convergence of positions on the new right and cultural left. 
Antiliberal, antibourgeois, antiuniversalist, antiegalitarian, and anti-individualist 
themes are fused with perspectives that oppose cultural homogenization and champion 
the recovery of cultural particularity. Thinkers like Benoist attempt to build bridges 
to the left, taking up themes of cultural diversity and difference and emphasizing 
the defense of local culture against instrumentalism and American capitalism. These 
approaches share features with the new right of the Weimar era, including ambiguity 
about the politics and structure of the new regimes. 
24 Conversations with Goran Dahl were very helpful in this section. Also, conservative 
German "antisociologists" (i.e., Helmut Schelsky, Friedrich Tenbruck, and Arnold 
Gehlen) express Nietzschean themes that deserve attention. But their positions and 
relation to the right require a lengthy inquiry and discussion that cannot be completed 
here. 
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The radical right embraces Nietzsche's scathing attacks on decadent 
liberalism, socialism, and democracy, his idea of post-Christian, Euro­
pean culture, and his aestheticism, elitism, vitalism, and masculinist met­
aphors. They see him as their precursor and even interpret their depar­
ture from his individualism to be a necessary Nietzschean step, shattering 
liberal decadence and purposelessness. However, radical right statism, 
regimentation, and anti-Semitism are all profoundly contradictory to 
Nietzsche's views. Racist national mythology and authoritarian politics 
clash directly with his antimoralist perspectivism and antinationalist af­
firmation of the mixing of peoples and cultures. The radical right's vision 
of the future bears no resemblance to his pluralistic ideals of cultural 
selection and post-Socratic culture. The radical right aims to liquidate 
individual particularity in order to preserve the particularity of a mythol-
ogized, national-cultural totality. Nietzsche implied that this move was 
already latent in his day; it manifests the new tyranny he saw arising in 
the twilight of Socratic culture. 
AFTER NIETZSCHE: A RETURN TO HISTORY? 
That life is in need of the services of history, however, must 
be grasped as firmly as must the proposition . . . that an 
excess of history is harmful to the living. (Nietzsche, Untimely 
Meditations) 
Nietzsche's absence from sociology diminishes disciplinary resources for 
fully engaging some of the most important classical and contemporary 
social theories. Moreover, his antisociology opposes tendencies to over­
value rationalization, overestimate levels of consensus and integration, 
and mistake domination and coercion for social integration or solidarity. 
It also poses sharp critiques of the social self and mass regimentation. 
And, his emphasis on the musical, bodily, and nonrational side of inter­
personal ties points to gaps in normative and instrumental theories of 
social bonds. As Maffesoli (1991, p. 19) argues, homo aestheticus ought 
to be entertained along with homo politicus and homo economicus. 
Nietzsche's affirmation of conflictive points of view and multiperspec-
tival theoretical fields points to the limits of "general theories" that arro­
gate all reality and integrated theories that abstractly harmonize irrecon­
cilable differences. Finally, his relentless critique of ethical formalism 
and concern for authenticity addresses the all-too-human side of intellec­
tual life, calling on us to reflect on the meaning of our practices and 
exercise responsibility. 
While social theory can be a fruitful source of empirical hypotheses 
and problems, its primary value derives from its capacity to clarify, 
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criticize, and debate the presuppositions of specialized practices and the 
broader "world images" in which they are embedded. It raises founda­
tional questions, which are bound up with normative issues and go be­
yond the empirical scope of strictly "sociological theory." In this regard, 
Nietzschean thought poses the question of the value of social knowledge 
in the context of the broader issue of its historical and cultural rootedness. 
Modern theorists, like Weber and Simmel, who engaged Nietzsche, ulti­
mately rejected the cultural exhaustion thesis, but seriously entertained 
his charge that sociology employs norms of a decadent epoch as its own 
standards. In Baier's words, these thinkers became "children of the 
pathos of distance" (Baier 1981-82, pp. 32-33). The best of the early 
generation of "Nietzschean" modern theorists shared a critical reflexivity 
about the foundations of their practices and the unknown horizons of 
knowledge that were missing in positivism. Modern theory has been 
enriched by the creative tensions and insights generated by past carriers 
of Nietzschean "otherness." Reengaging his perspective would also ben­
efit sociological theory today. 
Vincent Pecora (1991, pp. 129) portrays Nietzsche as an "indispensible 
mirror—'the bad conscience'—of a damaged bourgeois faith in historical 
reason thrown back on itself." From this vantage point, the current 
Nietzsche revival is not at all surprising. Nietzschean social theories 
gained momentum during the contractions of the post-World War II 
era—the growth and collapse of the period's rosy visions of progressive 
modernization and harmonious postindustrialism. The new approaches 
grew more popular during the late 1970s and 1980s when global restruc­
turing of political economies, geopolitics, and communications opened 
sociocultural and political borders to contestation and weakened the 
nation-state's capacity to mediate the relationship of capital and commu­
nity and conflicts over citizenship rights and identity (e.g., esp. relating 
to minority issues). Nietzschean emphases on cultural homogenization 
and liquidation of particularity were revived in the face of fresh threats 
to individuality, subgroup, and locality by new constellations of highly 
rationalized, powerful, fluid, decentered yet global, collective entities, 
conditions, and forces. Opposing approaches, such as Foucaultian micro-
politics and Habermasian universalism address the same context. 
Responding to the severe erosion of social democracy and the welfare 
state and the trend toward a more minimalist vision of democracy (i.e., 
free markets, suffrage, and formal legal rights), social theorists once again 
raise the issue of cultural exhaustion—in Adorno's words, they hold that 
"culture" no longer contains the "salt of truth."25 Today, however, 
25 "There are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness, only 
advertisements for the world through its duplication and the provocative lie which 
does not seek belief but commands silence," said Adorno ([1967] 1981, p. 34). Com-
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modern theorists, as well as Nietzscheans, express doubts about the vi­
tality of democratic ideals,26 Terry Eagleton (1992, pp. 30-39) holds 
that pervasive Nietzschean pessimism signifies a "crisis in Western cul­
ture"—culture is too fragmented to provide resources for voicing and 
reconciling societal contradictions. But Luc Ferry (1994, pp. 5-8) charges 
that Nietzschean deconstruction is itself exhausted, having lost the "abil­
ity to negate" or produce "anything new." He calls for a "historiciza-
tion" of theory and a return to "internal criticism" (i.e., analyzing "soci­
eties in the name of their own principles" and their unmet "promises"), 
which presumes the vitality of democratic culture. These differences be­
tween social theorists on the left demonstrate that the legacy of Nietzsche 
is still contested terrain. 
A growing number of social theorists, seeking democratic alternatives 
to postwar models of communism, social democracy, and liberalism, hold 
that the question of "radical democracy" must be posed anew. They 
entertain pluralist and antifoundationalist themes from new cultural the­
ory along with facets of earlier radical democratic theories.2. While 
Nietzsche was no democrat, his antimoralism and his critique of evolu­
tionary historicism are still useful deconstructive tools, pointing to the 
limits and vulnerabilities of any recovery of history and to the pitfalls 
of premature celebrations of newfound global interdependence. But 
Nietzsche himself did not give up entirely on the "historical sense." His 
normative vision of a pluralistic, experimental, post-Socratic culture was 
rooted in nascent conditions of his day. This aspect of his thought has not 
been taken up adequately in the three currents of appropriation discussed 
above, and it has yet to be explored in the full context of his antisociology. 
pare Horkheimer's portrayal of critical theory's earlier optimistic historicism: "Again 
and again in history, ideas have cast off their swaddling clothes and struck out against 
the social systems that bore them. . . . Thus originates the contradiction between the 
existent and ideology, a contradiction that spurs all historical progress" (Horkheimer 
[1947] 1974, p. 178; on Nietzsche and critical theory, see Miller [1978], Piitz [1981-82], 
Love [1987], Pecora [1991], and Habermas [1982, 1993]). 
26 Modern positions converge with postmodern approaches. For example, Fredric 
Jameson (1984, 1988), a leading cultural Marxist, holds that postmoderaization de­
stroys the cultural bases of ideology critique and all methods that claim to expose 
realities beneath distorted surfaces. Cultural conservatives, Daniel Bell (1978) and 
Frances Fukuyama (1992) also point to a postmodern erosion of democratic legitimacy. 
Even Habermas, the leading critic of postmodernism, holds that the lack of animate 
democratic norms requires a shift to an "unhistorical" method of critique (Habermas 
1979, pp. 96-97; 19876, pp. 1S3-97, 332-73, 383; 1987c, pp. 83-105, 339-40). 
27 This tendency is clear in current discussions of pragmatism and the renaissance of 
interest in John Dewey, whose thought overlaps with Nietzsche at many junctures 
(e.g., see Dewey [1925] 1988c; [1929] 1988c; [1934] 1989; [1938] 1986; [1939] 19886). 




An engagement of this vision with the emergent discourse on radical 
democracy could produce a new Nietzscheanism. 
Because sociology was not fully institutionalized until the middle of 
the post-World War II era, its theories, methods, and, even, readings 
of the classics are partly—perhaps largely—shaped by the culture of this 
possibly bygone era. Thus, it is an appropriate time for sociology to 
entertain a wider range of social theories, including the new visions of 
radical democracy. Inclusion of Nietzsche among the founders would 
enhance the discipline's historical sense as it rethinks its foundations and 
practices at the end of the postwar era. This aspect of his challenge 
is worth exploring. As he held, the "earthquake reveals new springs" 
(Nietzsche 1969c, p. 228). 
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